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CASE COMMENTS
UNITED STATES v. FOSTER LUMBER CO.:
NET OPERATING LOSSES AND CAPITAL GAINS -
YOU CAN HAVE TWO, BUT YOU ONLY GET ONE
N 1974 A CONFLICT DEVELOPED AMONG circuit courts over the applica-
tion of the net operating loss carryback provisions of the Internal Rev-
enue Code to years in which a corporate taxpayer enjoyed the benefit
of the "alternative" method for the computation of the capital gains
tax. In November 1976, the United States Supreme Court resolved
the conflict in favor of the Internal Revenue Service in United States v.
Foster Lumber Co.' This Case Comment will analyze Foster Lumber, as
well as some of the earlier conflicting decisions, in an effort to deter-
mine if the Supreme Court has effectively resolved the problem.
I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
A. "These Unimportant and Seldom Occurring Questions"
The question presented to the Court in Foster Lumber involved two
sections of the Internal Revenue Code that are brought into conflict in
relatively rare factual circumstances. The question appeared so esoteric
that in 1970 the First Circuit found no need to consider in depth "these
unimportant and seldom occurring questions."2  Unfortunately, by 1974
some ninety-nine cases had arisen;3 with a conflict among circuits and
some $20,000,000 in taxes in dispute, 4 the "unimportant" question
was ready for Supreme Court review.
Section 172 of the Code allows taxpayers to carry back net operat-
ing losses of the current year to offset the income of prior profitable
years.5 There is no dispute over the fact that the taxpayer owes no tax
for the current year, the loss year.6 What the taxpayer is attempting
to do, however, is carry back the current year's loss to a prior profitable
year, offset the income of the prior year with the loss of the current year,
reduce the tax on the prior year's income, and generate an immediate
tax refund. Section 172 provides for this kind of carryback of losses.
The motivation behind the enactment of section 172 was that
arbitrary annual accounting periods often impose drastic consequences
'429 U.S. 32 (1976).
2 Chartier Real Estate Co. v. Commissioner, 428 F.2d 474, 475 (1st Cir. 1970).
3 Mutual Assurance Soc'y Corp. v. Commissioner, 505 F.2d 128, 138 n.21 (4th Cir.
1974).
4 Id.
5 I.R.C. § 172 also allows the taxpayer to carry forward losses for use in future years.
Although all of the cases discussed in this Case Comment involved loss carrybacks, many
of the same issues arise in the computation of carryforwards.
' The corporate income tax is imposed when the taxpayer generates taxable income
but not when it suffers a loss. I.R.C. § 11(a) read with id. § 63(a).
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on taxpayers with cyclical income patterns. Section 172 permits lean
years to be offset against lush ones, and permits the tax to be computed
based upon something akin to an average taxable income over a period
of years. In this way, taxpayers with cyclical income patterns are not
taxed more heavily than those with more stable income patterns.
7
Section 1201 also confers a benefit on the taxpayer. The corporate
taxpayer first computes its tax under the "regular" method. This is the
tax that would be imposed without regard to section 1201. The tax-
payer then computes its tax under the section 1201 "alternative" meth-
od. This is the regular tax imposed on the ordinary income element of
earnings, plus a fiat-rate tax of 30 percent on capital gains. The tax
under the regular method is then compared with the tax under the alter-
native method, and the taxpayer must pay under the method that pro-
duces the lower tax. 8 The benefit conferred upon the taxpayer by
section 1201 is that capital gains are taxed at a 30 percent rate under
the alternative method, rather than at rates which can range as high as
48 percent under the regular method.9 Furthermore, the 30 percent
rate on capital gains is only imposed when it would yield a tax lower
than that imposed by the regular method.10 The fact that section 1201
provides two methods for the computation of the tax, but then levies the
tax under only one of the methods, is important to much of the analysis
that follows.1'
It has been shown that section 172 allows taxpayers to pay tax based
on income averaged over a period of years, and that section 1201 pro-
vides for reduced taxes on capital gains. Both sections confer benefits
on the taxpayer in the form of reduced taxes. The two sections are
brought into conflict when a corporate 12 taxpayer incurs a net operating
loss in a given year and seeks to carry back that loss to a year in which
the alternative method for the computation of capital gains was utilized.
It is given that there is no tax due for the current year since the tax-
payer incurred a loss. It is also given that there was a tax paid in the
prior year and that the alternative method produced a lower tax on that
year's activities than would have been produced under the regular meth-
7 See Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382, 386 & n.5 (1957). See generally
United States v. Foster Lumber Co., 429 U.S. 32, 42-44 (1976).
s I.R.C. § 1201(a).
9 Id. §§ 1201(a), 11(a). The 48 percent figure would apply to any amount in excess
of the $50,000 surtax exemption provided in section 11(d).
10 See I.R.C. § 1201(a).
II The policy behind the reduced tax on capital gains is to encourage the formation
and development of capital for investment by business. Theoretically, this investment
stimulates the economy and helps to create new jobs. This policy was the subject of
much discussion during the congressional consideration of the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
See generally Surrey, Reflections on the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
303, 313-15 (1976) (discussed the debates on the capital gains tax on individuals).
12 There is a similar conflict in the Code sections which deal with the noncorporate tax-
payer in a situation like that described in the text. Though different sections are in-
volved, they are conceptually analogous to sections 172 and 1201, and similar analysis is
used to resolve the conflict. The leading noncorporate taxpayer case is Axelrod v. Com-




od.13 In this factual situation, the Foster Lumber conflict is triggered.
When the taxpayer attempts to carry back the current year's loss to the
prior year, two questions arise. 4  First, can the loss carryback be off-
set against the prior year's capital gains for purposes of determining the
alternative tax in the prior year?' 5  The courts have consistently re-
sponded to this question in the negative.'6  Second, given that the loss
carryback cannot be used to offset the capital gain for purposes of the
alternative tax calculation, can the carryback loss in excess of the ordi-
nary income of the carryback year be used to offset a later year's in-
come? 7 It is this second question that was presented to the Court in
11 This occurs when there is a relatively large capital gain and little or no ordinary
income. In numerical terms the situation often appears as follows:
19X1 19X2 19X3
Ordinary Income (Loss) $ 100,000 $ -0- $(500,000)
Capital Gain 1,000,000 -0- -0-
Total Taxable
Income (Loss) $1,100,000 $ -0- $(500,000)
The taxpayer has incurred a net operating loss for the current year, 19X3. It seeks
to carry back that loss to 19X1. The tax in 19X1 was paid based upon the alternative
method because, with the large capital gain and relatively small ordinary income, that
method produced the lower tax.
14 Chartier Real Estate Co. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 346 (1969), the first case to
consider the conflict, bifurcated the analysis. Id. at 346-47. All of the cases since have
adopted a similar approach.
Is In terms of the example presented in note 13 supra, can the $500,000 loss from
19X3 be used to reduce the $1,000,000 capital gain in 19X1, or is the application of the
loss carryback limited to the $100,000 of ordinary income in 19X1?
16 Chartier Real Estate Co. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 346, 350-56 (1969), which re-
lied heavily on Weil v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 424 (1954), aff'd, 229 F.2d 593 (6th Cir.
1956). In Chartier, the corporate taxpayer had ordinary income of $1,115 and capital
gains of $83,787 for the year 1962. It computed and paid taxes based on the alternative
method because this computation resulted in a lower tax than could be obtained under the
regular method. In 1964, the taxpayer filed for a refund of a portion of its 1962 taxes.
The taxpayer's claim was that it should be permitted to offset 1962 income by an $11,458
loss carryback from 1963 and 1964.
The Commissioner conceded that had the taxpayer paid 1962 taxes based on the regu-
lar method, it would be permitted to offset both regular and capital gain income with
the loss carryback. He asserted, however, that because the taxpayer had paid tax under
the alternative method, its use of the loss carryback would be limited to $1,115, the
amount of ordinary income. The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner, noting:
The Commissioner's computation under the "alternative" method follows
scrupulously the terms of the statute. He first determined a "partial tax" under
section 1201(a)(1) which, admittedly, was zero; and then he added under sec-
tion 1201(a)(2) "an amount equal to 25 percent of . . . [the] excess" of the net
long-term capital gain over the short-term capital loss. The provisions of the stat-
ute are set forth with such specificity that they admit of no such reading as that
urged by petitioner, which seeks to subtract from "such excess" that portion of
the carryback loss that was not absorbed in the computation of the "partial tax"
in (a)(1). We hold that the Commissioner must be sustained. In so holding we
have found that the issue is indistinguishable from the one decided in Walter M.
Weil, . . . and that the legislative history supports the result reached.
The Weil case involved individual taxpayers and was decided under the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1939, but the critical facts were basically the same as those
in the present case. ...
52 T.C. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
In the cases since Chartier, this first question has not been put in issue. E.g., United
States v. Foster Lumber Co., 429 U.S. 32, 38 & n.5 (1976).
17 In terms of the example presented in note 13 supra, does the portion of the $500,000
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Foster Lumber. In statutory terms, the conflict centers around the mean-
ing of a sentence in section 172(b)(2): "The portion of such loss which
shall be carried to each of the other taxable years shall be the excess,
if any, of the amount of such loss over the sum of the taxable income
for each of the prior taxable years to which such loss may be carried."
B. Prior Case Law: Twelve to Nothing After the Eighth
1. First Up, Chartier
Chartier Real Estate Co. v. Commissioner " was the first case to
consider the conflict between sections 172(b)(2) and 1201. An under-
standing of the court's reasoning in Chartier is essential because most
of the later case law on the question relies on Chartier.
Chartier engaged in the rental of real estate; it occasionally sold
some of its rental property. During 1962, Chartier generated ordinary
income of $1,11519 and a capital gain of $83,787.20 Ignoring any
loss carryovers, the federal tax on Chartier's 1962 activities was $38,649
under the regular method and $21,281 under the alternative method.21
As section 1201(a) required, the tax paid was based upon the lower of
the two methods, in this case, $21,281 under the alternative method.
This is a basic section 1201 computation and it posed no particular
problem.
In 1964, Chartier incurred an $11,45822 net operating loss that it
sought to carry back to 1962. If it could do so, Chartier would have
reduced its 1962 income and thereby reduced the $21,281 tax paid on its
1962 activities. The Commissioner agreed that the 1964 loss of $11,458
could be carried back to 1962 to reduce that year's income. Since the
1962 tax was computed using the alternative method, however, the
question was how to apply the 1964 loss to the 1962 income. In a simpli-
fied tabular form the situation is set out below. Asterisks have been
used to represent those numbers that have no relevance to this discus-
sion.
1962 1963 1964
Ordinary Income $ 1,115 *
Capital Gain 83,787 *
Total Taxable Income (Loss) $84,902 $(11,458)
loss from 19X3 in excess of $100,000 (the 19X1 ordinary income) survive for use in 19X2
and later years?
Is 52 T.C. 346 (1969), afi'd per curiam, 428 F.2d 474 (lst Cir. 1970). While
both section 172 and section 1201 have been amended since the Chartier decision, the
statutory language analyzed in Chartier and in the other cases discussed in this Case Com-
ment has not been changed by the amendments.
19 For ease of reference, cents have been dropped from all figures used in the text.
20 These were the amounts after certain adjustments were agreed to by Chartier and
the Commissioner. 52 T.C. at 347-48. The adjustments are not relevant to this.dis-
cussion.
21 Id. at 348.




Both parties agreed that for purposes of the regular method computation
for 1962, the $11,458 carryback from 1964 could be utilized in full and
offset against the $1,115 of ordinary income and $10,343 of capital
gain. 23  That agreement was mooted, however, by the fact that the
1962 tax was paid under the alternative method, not the regular method.
Even with the full utilization of the 1964 carryback, the 1962 tax would
still be lower under the alternative method than under the regular meth-
od; any concessions under the regular method were of little concern to
Chartier.
The dispute arose over the computation of the 1962 alternative
method. Under that method, the taxpayer pays the regular tax on
ordinary income but a flat-rate tax of 25 percent 24 on capital gains.
The first question was whether to apply the $11,458 loss from 1964
only against the ordinary income of 1962 or whether some of the loss
could be applied against the capital gains of 1962.5 Relying heavily on
Weil v. Commissioner2 and legislative history, the Tax Court held that
Chartier could not use the 1964 loss carryback to offset 1962 capital
gains for purposes of the alternative method calculation.2 1 So, for pur-
poses of the alternative method calculation, Chartier could use its
$11,458 loss from 1964 to offset $1,115 of ordinary income from 1962,
but it could not use any of its $11,458 loss to offset any of its $83,787
of 1962 capital gains.28 This part of the Chartier decision has not been
seriously challenged.2 9
It was the second issue in Chartier that made the case important
for purposes of Foster Lumber. Did any part of the 1964 loss survive
for use in 1963 and subsequent years? Recall that the Commissioner
conceded that Chartier could fully utilize its 1964 loss carryback in
computing its 1962 tax under the regular method,30 but even with that
utilization, the regular method still produced a tax of $32,691 for 196231
- a tax higher than the 1962 alternative computation produced. The
alternative tax was $21,281 before the 1964 carryback utilization and
the losses were generated in different years does not affect the analysis. For convenience,
the $11,458 total will be referred to as the 1964 net operating loss.
23 See 52 T.C. at 349. The effect of this was to reduce the regular tax on 1962's
activities from $38,649 to $32,691. Id.; see table in the text accompanying note 33 infra.
24 The tax was 25 percent during the years in question in Chartier. It has since been
increased to 30 percent. I.R.C. § 1201(a).
25 Disregarding the carryback, the 1962 alternative tax was $21,281. See text accom-
panying note 21 supra. If the carryback was fully utilized in 1962, offsetting the $1,115
of ordinary income in full and reducing the capital gain to $73,444, the tax would be
$18,361 (25 percent of $73,444). If the carryback were limited to ordinary income and it
could not be used to offset capital gains, the tax would be $20,947 (25 percent of $83,787).
2' 23 T.C. 424, aff'd, 229 F.2d 593 (6th Cir. 1956). A good comparison of Weil and
Chartier is found in 48 J. URB. L. 999 (1971). The point is developed in note 16 supra.
27 52 T.C. at 350-56.
28 As discussed in note 25 supra, limiting the carryback application to ordinary in-
come resulted in little change in Chartier's alternative tax. The company owed $21,281
before utilization of the carryback and $20,947 after its utilization.
' See note 16 supra; see aivo 55 B.U. L. REv. 134, 137 n.14 (1975).
30 See text accompanying note 23 supra.
31 Note 23 supra.
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$20,947 after it.3 2 The Commissioner asserted that the 1964 carryback
was fully utilized in 1962 (and therefore none of the loss survived for
use in later years) because the carryback reduced income for purposes
of the 1962 regular tax computation by the full amount of the loss. He
was not impressed by the fact that the carryback of the $11,458 loss
had affected the 1962 alternative computation, and therefore the tax
paid, by only $334. This may be seen more readily in the following
table
Regular Tax Alternative Tax Tax
Liability Liability Payable33
Tax before 1964 carryback $38,649 $21,281 $21,281
Tax after 1964 carryback $32,691 $20,947 $20,947
Note that the utilization of the 1964 carryback produced a substantial
change in the 1962 regular tax liability because the loss was utilized in
full to offset both ordinary income and capital gains. Under the alterna-
tive method, however, the carryback produced very little change since it
was utilized only to the extent of ordinary income;3 4 the carryback
could not be used to offset capital gains under the alternative method.
Chartier argued that it is grossly unfair to assert that the carryback has
been fully utilized in a tax year similar to the one depicted in -the table
because the carryback produced so little change in the tax payable.
Therefore, Chartier asserted, the loss carryback in excess of ordinary
income (that portion not utilized under the alternative method) should
survive for use in subsequent years.
The Tax Court agreed with Chartier and advanced two theories to
support its holding that the 1964 carryback had not been fully utilized
in 1962. First, without citing any authority, the court found that the
purpose of carrybacks is to ameliorate the sometimes arbitrary effects
of annual tax accounting periods. If the Commissioner's argument that
the 1964 carryback was fully utilized in 1962 had been accepted, Char-
tier would not have fully enjoyed the benefit of the net operating loss
provisions in any year. The carryback had little effect on its 1962 tax
liability, and under the Commissioner's theory, none of the carryback
survived for use in years subsequent to 1962. The court found this to be
contrary to the intended purpose of section 172 and held that $10,343
of the 1964 loss survived for use in years subsequent to 1962.35
The Tax Court also found support for its decision in section 172(b)
(2).3' The court held that the term "taxable income," as used in this
32 $1,115 of 1962 ordinary income had been offset by the 1964 carryback, and this
offset reduced the alternative tax by $334.
31 This column represents the amount which is the lower of the two methods. I.R.C.
§ 1201(a).
3' The carryback was utilized under the alternative method to the extent of $1,115 of
1962 ordinary income. Note 32 supra.
-" $1,115 was utilized to offset the 1962 ordinary .income, therefore, $10,343 remained
for use in later years.




section of the Code, meant "that taxable income to which the loss is
actually applied in computing actual tax liability."37  By adopting this
narrow construction, the court was able to read section 172(b)(2) in
such a way that the 1964 loss survived for use in years subsequent to
1962.38
While the commentators have shown that the Chartier court's analysis
was weak 39 the case is important since it demonstrated that in certain
situations sections 172 and 1201 conflict and can produce a result
that seems anomalous given that both sections were designed to confer a
benefit on the taxpayer. The glaring flaw in Chartier is its superficial
analysis of the carryback utilization question. The portion of the opinion
dealing with that question covers only two full pages, 40 cites little legisla-
tive history to support its policy arguments, and, most importantly, fails
to undertake the kind of detailed statutory analysis so important in tax cases.
Thus, Chartier must be viewed as a case dealing with the issue, but
little else. Its precedential value is slight because its analysis was so
superficial.
While the Chartier decision leaves a good deal to be desired, criti-
cism of it should be tempered by the knowledge that it was a case of
first impression and that the arguments presented to the court were not
nearly as refined as they would be later on.4' The unfortunate thing
about Chartier, however, is not the weaknesses in the case itself, but
the fact that so many other courts readily accepted its holding with so
little analysis of their own. 42
2. After Chartier
In 1970, the First Circuit affirmed Chartier4 3 in a decision that would
stand for some time as the only appellate authority on the conflict
37 52 T.C. at 357-58.
3 See id.
3 E.g., Nagel, Planning to avoid wastage of NOL carryovers: A lesson from Chartier
Realty, 42 J. TAX. 26 (1973); 8 SAN DEGo L. REV. 442 (1971).
4o 52 T.C. at 356-58.
41 At this point, Chartier should be distinguished from a factually similar situation.
In Chartier, the tax in the carryback year, 1962, would have been paid under the alter-
native computation whether the Commissioner's or Chartier's argument on the first ques-
tion was accepted. Under both arguments, the alternative computation produced a lower
tax liability than the regular method. It is possible, however, for a situation to arise in
which the tax in the carryback year will be computed under one method if the Commis-
sioner's position is accepted, and under the other method if the taxpayer's position is ac-
cepted. This situation arose in Lone Manor Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 436
(1974), afl'd, [1977] STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 91,351 (3d Cir. Jan. 27, 1975) (un-
published opinion). The Lone Manor court was careful to distinguish the case from
Chartier, although they are factually and analytically similar. 61 T.C. at 442. For a
comparison of the two cases, see Nagel, Planning to avoid wastage of NOL carryovers:
A lesson from Chartier Realty, 42 J. TAX. 26, 27-28 (1975).
2 The trend began with the appeal of Chartier. The First Circuit affirmed in an opinion
that said little more than that there was nothing wrong with the Tax Court's holding.
Chartier Real Estate Co. v. Commissioner, 428 F.2d 474 (lst Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
" Chartier Real Estate Co. v. Commissioner, 428 F.2d 474 (1st Cir. 1970) (per
curiam). See also note 41 supra.
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between sections 172 and 1201. Despite the criticism of Chartier,"
eight other cases followed its holding; none of those opinions engaged
in much more than one page of analysis of the question.45  The First
Circuit's afflirmance of Chartier was accorded great weight by the courts
despite its cursory treatment of the question and the criticism of com-
mentators.
When the Eighth Circuit considered Foster Lumber, it affirmed an
unreported district court decision and followed Chartier.46 By late 1974,
the First, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits had all adopted Chartier,47 and
the Tax Court considered the issue so settled that it was disposing of
Chartier-type cases in memorandum decisions.48 The conflict between
sections 172 and 1201 appeared to be resolved but for one nagging prob-
lem - the Commissioner had not acquiesced in any of these cases49
and was still litigating the issue. His persistence was to be rewarded in
Mutual Assurance Soc'y Corp. v. Commissioner.50
3. Mutual Assurance: The Commissioner Scores in the Fourth
Despite the unbroken line of cases supporting Chartier, the Com-
missioner appealed the case of Mutual Assurance Soc'y Corp. to the
Fourth Circuit. He conceded that the facts in the case could not be
distinguished from Chartier, but asserted that Chartier was wrongly
decided and should not be adopted as the rule in the Fourth Circuit.5 1
In a 3-1 decision, the Fourth Circuit refused to follow Chartier and re-
versed the Tax Court.
Mutual Assurance is important because it was the first case to reject
the Chartier decision, and because it was the first case after Chartier
to engage in a detailed analysis of the conflict between sections 172 and
1201. It is worthwhile to consider Mutual Assurance because much of
41 See note 39 supra.
45 Naegele v. United States, 383 F. Supp. 1041 (D. Minn. 1973) (memorandum opin-
ion); Data Prod. Corp. v. United States, 74-2 U.S. TAX CAS. 9759 (1974), aff d, [1977]
STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 90,679 (9th Cir. Dec. 27, 1974) (unpublished opinion);
Olympic Foundry Co. v. United States, 72-1 U.S. TAX CAS. 9299 (W.D. Wash. 1972),
afi'd, 493 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1974); Continental Equities, Inc., 43 TAX CT. MEM. DEC.
(P-H) 755 (1974); and two decisions that were later reversed, Sidney Axelrod, 42 TAX CT.
MEM. DEC. (P-H) 853 (1973); Mutual Assurance Soc'y Corp., 42 TAX CT. MEm,. DEC.
(P-H) 811 (1973).
46 Foster Lumber Co. v. United States, 500 F.2d 1230 (8th Cir. 1974). The eight de-
cisions cited in note 45 supra, the circuit and lower court decisions in Foster Lumber,
plus the two in Chartier represent a total of twelve decisions rendered against the Com-
missioner.
' Foster Lumber Co. v. United States, 500 F.2d 1230 (8th Cir. 1974); Olympic Foun-
dry Co. v. United States, 493 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1974); Chartier Real Estate Co. v.
Commissioner, 428 F.2d 474 (1st .ir. 1979).
4 E.g., Continental Equities, Inc., 43 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (P-H) 755 (1974); Mutual
Assurance Soc'y Corp., 42 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (P-H) 853 (1973).
49 The Commissioner has taken no action in response to any of the cases cited in
note 45 supra, Chartier, or Foster Lumber.
0 505 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'g 42 TAX CT. MEM. DEC. (P-H) 811 (1973).
Si 505 F.2d at 132. See generally Note, Net Operating Losses and the Alternative Tax
Computaiion: Growing Tension Between Two Code Sections, 36 U. PiT. L. REV. 979




the reasoning presented in it was later utilized by the Supreme Court
in Foster Lumber.
The Fourth Circuit conceded that every case prior to Mutual As-
surance had followed Chartier, however, the court criticized the cases
on the ground that none of them had analyzed the section 172 problem,
but rather had blindly followed Chartier.52 Because of this lack of
analysis, the Fourth Circuit was unimpressed by the unanimous precedent
favoring Chartier, and undertook its own examination of the section
172 question.
While the court examined both the statute and its legislative history,
it indicated that in federal tax cases the analysis should begin with the
statute. 3 The statutory analysis focused on the term "taxable income"
in the phrase, "The portion of such loss which shall be carried to each
of the other taxable years shall be the excess, if any, of the amount of
such loss over the sum of the taxable income for each of the prior taxable
years to which such loss may be carried.- 5 4 Mutual Assurance as-
serted that the term taxable income means "income on which the tax
is actually paid." Since the tax was paid based upon the alternative
method, and only a portion of the loss was utilized in the calculation of
that method, there was some excess to be carried to later years.
55
The Commissioner was not so ready to add words to section 172(b)(2).
He asserted that since section 172 did not redefine the term taxable
income, the general definitions of sections 61(a) and 63(a) controlled.
If so, taxable income encompasses both ordinary income and capital
gains, and the loss carryback would have to exceed both of those ele-
ments before it would survive for use in a later year. In the classic
Chartier factual situation, however, the loss carryback exceeds ordinary
income in the carryback year but not the sum of ordinary income plus
capital gains. Thus, under the Commissioner's definition of taxable in-
come, there would be no carryback in excess of taxable income that
could survive for use in years subsequent to the carryback year.
Rather than discussing at length the argument over section 172(b)(2),
the Mutual Assurance court concluded that there was "positive evidence,
on the face of the statute," that the Commissioner's definition was
correct. 56  The evidence was the existence of section 172(d)(2)(B).
52 505 F.2d at 133.
See id. It will be developed later in this Case Comment that the legislative history
of section 172 may support the taxpayer while the statute supports the government.
Thus, whether the statute or the legislative history is analyzed first may make a dif-
ference. It would appear, however, that the analysis must begin with the statute since
that represents the congressional statement of the law. Only if the statute is unclear is
there any need to refer to the legislative history behind the statute. See Helvering v.
Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 93-94 (1934).
I.R.C. § 172(b)(2) (emphasis added).
Recall that the alternative tax is the sum of the tax on ordinary income plus the
flat-rate tax on capital gains. I.R.C. § 1201(a). Weul and Chartier established that the
carryback could not be used to offset the capital gain but could be used to offset
ordinary income. Since the carryback affected the tax actually payable only to the extent
of ordinary income, any loss carryback in excess of ordinary income is "excess" under
section 172(b)(2) and available for use in later years.
5 505 F.2d at 134.
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That section made certain adjustments to the taxable income of non-
corporate taxpayers. While it was not itself relevant to the issue before
the Mutual Assurance court, its existence was important because, if
Mutual Assurance's narrow construction of the term taxable had been
adopted, section 172(d)(2)(B) would have been rendered superfluous. 57
Certainly any construction of section 172(b)(2) that would render an-
other section of the Code superfluous must be viewed with suspicion.
The Fourth Circuit also found support for the Commissioner's defini-
tion of taxable income in the legislative history. Although the history
behind sections 172 and 1201 did not address the conflict between the.
two sections,58 the Mutual Assurance court focused on the different
kinds of legislation that had dealt with net operating loss carrybacks. 59
The court noted that from 1924 to 1934, the Code specifically allowed
a loss carryback in excess of ordinary income in the carryback year to be
offset against capital gains. In this way, the loss was fully utilized in
the carryback year in both the regular and alternative calculations, the
carryback always affected the tax liability for the carryback year, and
the problem presented to the court in Mutual Assurance would not have
arisen. The court reasoned that since for ten years Congress structured
the Code in such a way that the problem presented in this case could not
have arisen, and since Congress later changed the Code, it implicitly
intended the result which Mutual Assurance complained of.6 0
The court also noted that if the Eighth Circuit had considered the
legislative history from 1924 to 1934 and section 172(d)(2)(B), it might
not have followed the rule announced in Chartier.61 Regardless of what
the Eighth Circuit might have done, however, the Sixth Circuit, in
Axelrod v. Commissioner,6 2 also decided not to adopt the Chartier
rule, thus setting the stage for the Supreme Court review of the conflict
between sections 172 and 1201.
57 505 F.2d at 134-35. See text accompanying notes 80-83 infra.
5' See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 31-33, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4662-63; H.R. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 30, reprinted in
[19541 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5280.
, I.R.C. § 172 and its predecessors.
60 505 F.2d at 136-38.
61 505 F.2d at 136-38 & n.22.
Two articles have suggested that the special loss carryover provisions for life insurance
companies, contained in I.R.C. § 812, are analogous to section 172, and that since sec-
tion 812 codifies a rule similar to that adopted by Chartier section 172 should be construed
to achieve a result similar to that codified in section 812. In other words, since section
812 codified the Chartier construction of section 172, this codification should be inter-
preted to mean that Chartier was correct. See Bixler & Voght, Is the answer to the
Chartier principle dilemma contained in Subchapter L?, 43 J. TAX. 344 (1975); contra,
8 SAN DIco L. REv. 442 (1971). Mutual Assurance was an insurance company but, ap-
parently, it was not within the purview of section 812 because it was not a life insurance
company. Despite the fact that an insurance company was involved, the Mutual Assur-
ance opinion did not discuss the section 812 analogy.
62 507 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1974). Although the case involved a noncorporate tax-
payer, the Sixth Circuit cited Mutual Assurance to support its theory that Congress in-




II. THE SUPREME COURT INTERVENES:
United States v. Foster Lumber Co.
A. The Facts, As Usual
The factual situation in Foster Lumber fit the pattern set by Chartier.
In 1966, Foster Lumber had ordinary income of $7,236 and capital gains
of $166,634. It sustained a loss of $42,203 in 1968 and sought to carry
the loss back to offset its 1966 income. It offset in full the $7,236 of
ordinary income in 1966 and filed a claim for refund, asserting that
$34,967 ($42,203 less $7,236) of its 1968 loss survived for use in years
subsequent to 1966. The Commissioner disallowed the claim for re-
fund.63 Both the trial court and the Eighth Circuit agreed with Foster
Lumber and allowed the claim for refund.6 4
B. The Majority
1. The Statute
Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart attempted to discern the
meaning of section 172(b)(2) by reading the statute without the aid of
legislative history.6 5 He first addressed the two statutory arguments
which Foster Lumber advanced; the majority found neither persuasive.
Foster Lumber's first statutory argument6 6 turned on the last clause
in section 172(b)(2). "The portion of such loss which shall be carried to
each of the other taxable years shall be the excess, if any, of the amount
of such loss over the sum of the taxable income for each of the prior
taxable years to which such loss may be carried."67 The argument was
that the italicized phrase modifies the term "taxable income" as well as
the phrase "each of the prior taxable years." If Chartier was correct in
holding that taxable income means only that income upon which the tax
is actually computed, 68 then the loss would not be fully utilized in 1966;
part of Foster Lumber's loss ($34,967) would survive for use in a later
year.69
The Court did not accept the argument, for to do so would mean that
the phrase "taxable income ... to which such loss may be carried"
would have to be read "taxable income to which such loss may be car-
ried and deducted, resulting in a reduction of tax liability."70 The prob-
63 429 U.S. 32, 35-36 (1976). See generally Note, United States v. Foster Lumber
Co., 97 S. Ct. 204 (1976) - Corporate Net Operating Loss Carrybacks "Absorbed" by
Capital Gains, 30 TAx LAW. 807 (1977).
14 Foster Lumber Co. v. United States, 500 F.2d 1230 (8th Cir. 1974), affirming an
unpublished decision from the Western District of Missouri which sustained Foster Lum-
ber's claim for refund.
6 See generally note 53 supra.
I In its brief, Foster Lumber treated the two statutory arguments as one. See Brief
for Respondent at 27-32, United States v. Foster Lumber Co., 429 U.S. 32 (1976). The
Court, however, dealt with them separately; for the sake of simplicity, they should be
treated separately.
I.R.C. § 172(b)(2) (emphasis added).
6 Chartier Real Estate Co. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 346, 357-58 (1969).
See 429 U.S. at 39-41.
70 Id. at 41.
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lem with Foster Lumber's reading is that to accept it, the term taxable
income, a term of art, must mean something different for purposes of
section 172(b)(2) than it does for any other section of the Code. For
reasons that will be developed below, the Court properly rejected the
idea that the existence of the words "to which such loss may be carried,"
gives some added, special meaning to the term taxable income.
The second statutory argument also involved the meaning of the
term taxable income as used in section 172(b)(2). In this argument,
however, the Court attempted to ascertain the meaning of the term by
reference to other sections of the Code7 ' rather than to other parts of
section 172(b)(2).
The Court reasoned that since taxable income is not specifically de-
fined within section 172(b)(2), the general definitions of the term else-
where within the Code72 should control. There is no doubt that those
general definitions -encompass both capital gains and ordinary income.
73
Accordingly, the loss carried back to 1966 would have had to exceed
both 1966 ordinary income and capital gains before any of the carry-
back would survive for use in years subsequent to 1966. In Foster
Lumber, the loss carryback from 1968 was $42,203, and the total tax-
able income in 1966 was $173,870. 7 4 The carryback did not exceed
total taxable income (though it did exceed ordinary income). There-
fore, all of the 1968 loss was absorbed in 1966; none survived for use in
subsequent years.
The Court's analysis of the definition of taxable income for purposes
of section 172(b)(2) is persuasive. One part of section 172(b)(2) does
modify the general definitions of the term taxable income, 75 but that
modification was not relevant to the case before the Court. Given
that section 172(b)(2) makes no relevant modifications to the term, there
is nothing to suggest that Congress intended the term to mean anything
other than what is found within the general definitions elsewhere in
the Code.76 As the Court suggested, these general definitions clearly
include both capital gains and ordinary income, and defeat Foster Lum-
ber's argument.
It appears that the Court is correct in this conclusion. Section 172
(b)(2) is very specific. Congress redefined the term for some purposes
covered by that section but not for the one in question. To argue that
Congress did not redefine the term for purposes of the question before
the Court because of an inadvertent omission, seems tenuous at best, es-
pecially when the section is as specific as section 172(b)(2).
The Court pointed out that Congress redefined the term taxable in-
come in other sections of the Code which are analogous in language
71 Recall that in the first statutory argument Foster Lumber attempted to discern the
meaning of the term taxable income by reference to other clauses within section 172(b)(2).
71 I.R.C. §§ 61(a), 63(a).
71 429 U.S. at 36-37.
71 $7,236 ordinary income plus $166,634 capital gains. Id. at 208 n.6.
75 I.R.C. § 172(b)(2) (third sentence). See text accompanying notes 80-83 infra.




and policies to section 172(b)(2), but it rejected77 the argument that
congressional redefinition of the term in these analogous sections dem-
onstrated an intent to redefine the term for purposes of section 172
(b)(2).7 8 The Court's rejection of this argument is appropriate. Again,
section 172(b)(2) is quite specific. To suggest that Congress intended a
redefinition of taxable income in section 172(b)(2) because of a redef-
inition in analogous sections, seems to strain reasonable statutory con-
struction.
Both of these statutory arguments are variations of the same idea.
Neither argument disputed the fact that section 172(b)(2) does not rede-
fine the term taxable income for purposes of the question before the
Court in Foster Lumber. The argument was that while section 172(b)(2)
does not redefine the term, the general definitions of the Code do not
control. As discussed above, the fact that Congress modified the defi-
nition of taxable income in analogous sections and in other parts of sec-
tion 172(b)(2) does not seem to be particularly persuasive evidence that
Congress inadvertently omitted an intended modification of the term in
this part of section 172(b)(2). This "omission" argument seems to be
further rebutted by the fact that Congress undertook a major revision of
the Code in 1976, but did not correct the pertinent "omission" even
though there was a minor modification to section 172(b)(2).7 9
The Court could have buttressed this statutory analysis with its dis-
cussion of section 172(d)(2)(B). In a later footnote,80 the Court cited
that section in support of the proposition that the term taxable income
includes capital gains. This was an argument advanced, and more fully
developed, in Mutual Assurance."' The argument concerned the treat-
ment of noncorporate taxpayers, but the part of the Code involved, sec-
tion 172(d)(2)(B), shed some light on the meaning of the term taxable
income within section 172(b)(2). For purposes of the argument, it is
important to note the difference between the treatment of capital gains
for corporate taxpayers and the treatment for noncorporate taxpayers.
Corporate taxpayers have the benefit of the section 1201(a) alternative
tax which provides a flat-rate tax of 30 percent on capital gains, when
that rate produces a tax lower than the regular method. Noncorporate
taxpayers, under section 1202, are permitted to deduct from gross in-
come one-half of the net capital gains for the year, and then compute
their tax on this reduced taxable income. Corporate taxpayers enjoy a
reduced tax rate on capital gains; noncorporate taxpayers enjoy a deduc-
tion from taxable income.
Section 172(b)(2)(A) notes that the term taxable income, as used in
section 172(b)(2), is modified for some purposes by section 172(d)(2)(B).
77 429 U.S. at 37 11.3.
7' The argument was advanced in Bixler & Voght, Is the answer to the Chartier prin-
ciple dilemma contained in Subchapter L?, 43 J. TAx. 344 (1975); contra, 8 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 442, 447-48 (1971). See note 61 supra for a development of the argument.
" Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 1901(a)(29)(C)(iv), Pub. L. No. 94455, 90 Stat. 1769.
'0 429 U.S. at 48 n.18.
s See Mutual Assurance Soc'y Corp. v. Commissioner, 505 F.2d 128, 134-35 (4th Cir.
1974).
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Section 172(d)(2)(B) prohibits noncorporate taxpayers, in computing
taxable income, from deducting one-half of capital gains as allowed by
section 1202. The Mutual Assurance court reasoned that the existence
of section 172(d)(2)(B), and its disallowance of the section 1202 deduc-
tion, was evidence that taxable income, as used within section 172(b)
(2), must include capital gains. The Mutual Assurance court's reason-
ing was that because section 172(d)(2)(B) disallows the deduction of
one-half the capital gains for noncorporate taxpayers, the purpose must
be to negative the section 1202 deduction when computing taxable in-
come for purposes of section 172(b)(2). Section 172(d)(2)(B) would
exist only if Congress assumed that taxable income within section
172(b)(2) included capital gains. Otherwise, section 172(d)(2)(B)
would be superfluous; there would be no need to disallow deductions for
capital gains if, as Foster Lumber argued, taxable income for purposes bf
section 172(b)(2) did not include capital gains.
The following hypothetical may help to illustrate the section 172
(d)(2)(B) argument. Assume a corporate and a noncorporate taxpayer
have computed their respective taxable incomes, first for general tax
purposes and then for purposes of section 172(b)(2):
For general tax purposes: Corporate Noncorporate
Ordinary Income $100 $100
Capital Gains 50 50
Gross Income 150 150
Section 1202 deduction for
noncorporate taxpayers - 25
Taxable Income for general tax
computation purposes $150 $125
For section 172(b)(2) purposes: Corporate Noncorporate
Ordinary Income $100 $100
Capital Gains 50 50
Gross Income 150 150
Section 1202 deduction denied
by section 172(d)(2)(B) - -
Taxable Income for section
172(b)(2) purposes $150 $150
Note that taxable income for purposes of section 172(b)(2) is the same
for both taxpayers, and that the achievement of such equality appears to
be the reason for the enactment of section 172(d)(2)(B) .12 Consider, on
the other hand, the results if Foster Lumber's theory were accepted: that
taxable income, and therefore gross income, does not include capital
gains for purposes of section 172(b)(2).
s1 The fact that taxable income for general tax computation purposes is different for
corporate and noncorporate taxpayers is not significant. The taxable income for the corpo-
rate taxpayer will be treated more favorably in the computation of the tax liability through
the use of the section 1201(a) alternative tax. Thus, even though the taxable income for
tax computation purposes appears to be unfairly different, the difference is compensated




For section 172(b)(2) purposes: Corporate Noncorporate
Ordinary Income $100 $100
Capital Gains -0- -0-
Gross Income 100 100
Section 1202 deduction denied
by section 172(d)(2)(B) -0- ?
Section 1202 would not permit a deduction for one-half of capital gains
when those gains have not been included in gross income, nor would sec-
tion 172(d)(2)(B) deny a section 1202 deduction for capital gains not in-
cluded in gross income for section 172(b)(2) purposes. Only the govern-
ment's construction of section 172(b)(2) avoids making section 172(d)
(2)(B) superfluous. Thus, it appears that taxable income within sec-
tion 172(b)(2) must include capital gains. Though confusing, this argu-
ment supports the decision in Foster Lumber, but, regrettably, the Court
did not develop the argument in its opinion."
One statutory argument that the Court mentioned only in passing is
the existence of regulations that deal with the problem presented in
Foster Lumber. The majority opinion mentioned in a footnote that the
regulations do not support Foster Lumber's interpretation of section 172
(b)(2);8 4 the dissent did not discuss them at all.85  While the Supreme
Court is not bound by the regulations,86 they may be useful in attempt-
ing to discern congressional intent. In this case, there were long-
standing regulations contrary to the result in Chartier and the position
taken by Foster Lumber."7
Generally, the existence of long-standing regulations indicates con-
gressional approval of the interpretation of the statute contained therein.
This implication is especially strong when the Code section has been
amended, but Congress has not changed it to counter the regulations'
interpretation. In such a case, it appears that the legislature has im-
plicitly approved of the regulations' interpretation, otherwise it would
have acted to counter that interpretation.8 8 In Foster Lumber, there were
long-standing regulations interpreting section 172(b)(2) contrary to the
rule of Chartier. The Court could have inferred from the long-standing
existence of the regulations that Congress implicitly approved of that
interpretation. While the inference certainly is not strong enough to be
determinitive of the issue,8 9 it does buttress the Court's conclusion that
Chartier was incorrect.
83 Again, however, this support is drawn from inferences provided by other sections
of the Code. See also text accompanying notes 77-79 supra.
84 429 U.S. at 41 n.8.
15 See 429 U.S. at 49-59.
816 See United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 550, 557 (1973); Bingler v. Johnson,
394 U.S. 741, 749-51 (1969).
" See Treas. Reg. § 1.172-4(b)(1), T.D. 6192, 1956-2 C.B. 132, 142.
" See United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1967).
89 It has also been asserted that Congress' inaction after the Chartier decision implies
congressional approval of the result in that case. Mutual Assurance Soc'y Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 505 F.2d 128, 138 (4th Cir. 1974) (dissent). A stronger inference, however,
would be that if Congress implicitly approved of anything, it was the regulation rather
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In summary, the Court accepted neither of Foster Lumber's statutory
arguments. There is nothing within section 172(b)(2) to indicate that
the term taxable income means anything other than what is stated in
the general definition sections of the Code. Likewise, the other sections
of the Code related to operating losses provide no clear-cut indication
that Congress intended to modify the definition of taxable income for
purposes of section 172(b)(2); in fact, section 172(d)(2)(B) seems to
imply that the broad definition of taxable income for purposes of sec-
tion 172(b)(2) is correct. Both of Foster Lumber's statutory arguments
require some rather strained statutory construction, therefore, the Court
properly rejected them.90 The majority could have found additional
support for its position in the regulations, but apparently because the
validity of the regulations was not put in issue,9' the Court did not con-
sider their effect on the question.
2. Policy and Legislative History
Although the government presented a strong statutory case, Foster
Lumber effectively supported its position with policy arguments. The
company argued that both section 17292 and section 1201 confer
benefits on the taxpayer and that when two ameliorative Code provi-
sions conflict, the statute should not be read in such a way that the
benefit of one Qf the provisions is denied.93  Unfortunately, as dis-
cussed above, Foster Lumber's asserted result would have required a
rather strained construction of the statute.
Three policy and legislative history arguments were presented to the
Court. First, Foster Lumber contended that the government's construc-
tion of section 172 would frustrate the policy behind loss carrybacks.
Second, the history of carryback legislation from 1924 to 1934 showed
than the Chartier holding. The regulation had been in force since 1956, see note 87
supra, Chartier was not affirmed until 1970. Congress probably viewed Chartier as an
aberration and, consequently, took no action to correct it. It was not until 1974 that two
other circuits adopted Chartier. See note 47 supra and accompanying text. Thus, when
Foster Lumber came before the Supreme Court in 1975, if there was any inference to be
drawn from congressional inaction, it would seem to be the approval of a nineteen-year-
old regulation rather than approval of two cases, one six years old and the other two years
old.
" An excellent article which analyzes the statute and adopts the Court's construction
is May, Net Operating Losses and Capital Gains - A Deceptive Combination, 29 TAX LAW.
121, 129-33 (1975).
9 The appellate decision did not mention them, see Foster Lumber Co. v. United States,
500 F.2d 1230 (8th Cir. 1974), and in its brief for the Supreme Court, Foster Lumber did
not discuss them. See Brief for Respondent, Foster Lumber Co. v. United States, 429
U.S. 32 (1976).
92 See generally Furber, Chartier and Beyond: The NOL Carryover and the Alternative
Capital Gains Tax, 53 TAXES 601 (1975); Hamovit & Silver, An analysis of the loss-
wastage problem in view of Sup. Ct.'s Foster Lumber decision, 46 J. TAX. 100 (1977); 29
OKLA. L. REV. 1010 (1976).
93 A substantial portion of Foster Lumber's brief was devoted to a discussion of the
policy behind sections 1201 and 172 and to how Foster Lumber's interpretation of section
172 best reflected those policies. Brief for Respondent at 12-26. The dissent in Foster





that Congress in the past legislatively dictated the result adopted in
Mutual Assurance and rejected in Chartier. Third, the construction ad-
vanced by Foster Lumber may confer a greater benefit than either
section 172 or section 1201 alone, and therefore may be unreasonable.
Foster Lumber's main policy argument, and a very effective one, was
that the government's construction of section 172(b)(2) frustrated the
policy behind loss carrybacks.9 4 The chart below illustrates this point:9 5
Year Ended Ordinary Income Capital Gain Total
(Loss)
1966 $ 7,000 $167,000" $174,000
1967 114,000- 115,000- 229,000
1968 (42,000) -0- (42,000)
Total $ 79,000 $282,000 $361,000
Under the government's statutory construction, the 1968 loss of $42,000
would be carried back to offset in full the 1966 ordinary income of
$7,000; none of the loss would survive for use in years subsequent to
1966. If that construction is correct, no tax would be paid on the 1968
activities since that was a loss year; also no tax would be paid on the
1966 ordinary income since that amount had been fully offset by the 1968
carryback. Thus, after the government's carryback, tax would be levied
on the 1967 activities and on the 1966 capital gains (those items marked
with asterisks). The income subject to tax would be $396,000. As the
total column shows, however, Foster Lumber's total income during this
period was only $361,000. The difference is .$35,000 of the 1968 loss
that the government asserted was utilized in 1966.
Foster Lumber's policy argument was patent. If the purpose behind
loss carryovers is to ameliorate the sometimes arbitrary effects of annual
accounting periods, why, when only $7,000 of the 1968 loss was used
to offset income in 1966, should not the remaining $35,000 of 1968 loss
have survived for use in subsequent years? 96 If Foster Lumber's con-
struction of section 172 had been accepted, the remaining $35,000 of
1968 loss carryback could have been used to offset 1967 ordinary in-
come, and Foster Lumber would have been taxed on only $361,000, 97
its total income for the three years. This approach would have effec-
tively implemented the policy behind loss carrybacks. Foster Lumber
would have paid tax based upon its total income for the three years,
irrespective of the pattern of those earnings within the three-year period.
The rebuttal to the argument that $35,000 of the 1968 carryback
should have been applied to 1967 ordinary income is that Foster Lumber
enjoyed the benefit of the 1968 carryback even though it did not
'4 See text accompanying notes 5-7 supra.
15 See Brief for Respondent at 10, United States v. Foster Lumber Co., 429 U.S. 32
(1976). The figures in this chart were rounded to the nearest thousand dollars.
'6 Recall that the carryback cannot be offset against either year's capital gains.
Weil v. Commissioner, 229 F.2d 593 (6th Cir. 1956).
9 This figure represents the company's capital gains from 1966 and 1967 and $79,000
of ordinary income from 1967.
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survive for use subsequent to 1966. Because of the relatively large
capital gains in 1966, Foster Lumber's tax was computed under the al-
ternative method, which accords favorable treatment to corporate tax-
payers with large capital gains. The regular method yields a larger tax in
this situation and, under the provisions of the Code, would not be used.98
The government argued that Foster Lumber had enjoyed the benefit
of the carryback because it served to reduce the tax under the regular
method. This argument is rather weak, however. One would have a
difficult task convincing Foster Lumber, or any other taxpayer, that it
enjoyed the benefit of its 1968 carryback because the carryback served
to reduce the 1966 regular tax, when the 1966 tax liability was com-
puted under the lower alternative method, not the regular method.
Rather than asserting that Foster Lumber enjoyed the benefit of a carry-
back which did not affect its tax liability, the government should have
formulated the issue in policy terms: Should the taxpayer enjoy the
benefit of having a loss carryback survive for use in subsequent years
when the tax on the year to which the loss was first carried was based
on the ameliorative alternative method? Unfortunately, the majority
did not address this policy question;99 rather, the majority relied on the
bare language of the section 172.
In examining the history of carryback legislation, the Court ap-
propriately noted that Congress had often permitted the "wasting" of
net operating losses and, therefore, that Foster Lumber's argument
against such waste was not persuasive without further support.' °° Al-
though Foster Lumber raised the issue, the Court did not discuss the
history of carryback legislation from 1924 to 1934.101 In Mutual As-
surance, the Fourth Circuit was impressed with the fact that from 1924
to 1934 the Code specifically provided for the result reached by the
Chartier court. When the Code was amended in 1934, Congress enacted
the predecessor to the current section 172. The Mutual Assurance court
interpreted this action to mean that Congress specifically rejected the
result later adopted by the Chartier court; in other words, when Con-
gress amended the Code, it was specifically rejecting prior law.102
What the Fourth Circuit failed to recognize, and what the Court in
Foster Lumber did not discuss, was the fact that the legislation in force
from 1924 to 1934 was only tangentially related to the question before
those courts. The Fourth Circuit did recognize that the legislation in
question expressly allowed loss carrybacks in excess of ordinary income
to be offset against capital gains. 10 3 The problem treated by this legis-
9 See I.R.C. § 1201.
9 The dissent did discuss this issue, however. See text accompanying notes 121-23
infra.
100 429 U.S. at 43-46.
101 Foster Lumber advanced several arguments based upon the legislation in effect
during this period. Brief for Respondent at 39-42. Surprisingly, the dissent also failed to
address this issue. See 429 U.S. at 49-59.
'02 Mutual Assurance Soc'y Corp. v. Commissioner, 505 F.2d 128, 136-38 (4th Cir.
1974); see text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.




lation was very different from that before the Fourth Circuit in Mutual
Assurance. In the discussion of Chartier in this Case Comment, 104 it
was noted that there were two questions before the Tax Court in that
case. First, could Chartier offset its loss carrybacks against capital
gains? The Chartier court held that the carryback could not be used
to offset capital gains.'0 5  The Tax Court then asked whether any part
of the carryback in excess of ordinary income survived for use in sub-
sequent years, since it could not be used to offset capital gains in the
earliest carryback year. It was this second question that was important
in Chartier, and only the second question was before the courts in
Mutual Assurance and Foster Lumber.
The Fourth Circuit in Mutual Assurance mistakenly attempted to
draw some negative inference from the fact that Congress, at one time,
had specifically allowed loss carrybacks to be offset against capital gains,
but later disallowed such offsets. This history dealt only with the first
question discussed above. As long as that question (whether loss carry-
backs could be offset against capital gains) was answered affirmatively
by section 172, there was no need to proceed to the second question;
the carryback was fully utilized through a reduction of capital gains,
and there was no question of survival for use in subsequent years. 06
The fact that Congress subsequently amended the statute to answer the
first question in the negative'0 7 sheds no light on congressional inten-
tions concerning the second question (whether any part of the carryback
survived for use in later years). It strains implication to say that simply
because Congress amended the Code to remove a provision that allowed
carrybacks to be offset against capital gains, it also intended to prohibit
the survival of those carrybacks for use in subsequent years. It seems
104 See text accompanying notes 25-30 supra.
105 Id.
101 On its face, the Code in effect from 1924 to 1934 appeared more liberal than the
result reached by Chartier. Under the old Code, the taxpayer enjoyed the benefit of the
loss carryback in the earliest carryback year; the loss could be offset against the capital
gains of that earliest year, a result prohibited under the post-1934 Code by Weil. See note
107 infra. As a practical matter, however, Chartier was more liberal than the old Code.
While Chartier would not allow the loss to be offset against capital gains in the earliest
carryback year, it did allow the loss to survive for use in a subsequent year, a year in which
the loss could be offset against ordinary income. The taxpayer would prefer this treatment.
Rather than use the loss to offset capital gains income, which is taxed at 30 percent, the
taxpayer would much rather offset ordinary income, which is taxed at 48 percent. So
while the old Code appeared more generous on its face, Chairtier reached a result the
taxpayer would prefer in most situations. See May, Net Operating Losses and Capital
Gains - A Deceptive Combination, 29 TAX LAW. 121, 136-38 (1975).
The text notes that under the old Code, the second question was never reached be-
cause the loss could be offset in full against the capital gains of the earliest carryback
year. If, however, the loss exceeded both the ordinary income and the capital gains of
that earliest year, the survival question arose. There were no cases on point, but it ap-
pears that the language of the old Code was broad enough to allow the loss in excess of
ordinary income and capital gains to survive for use in a later year. See Act of June 2,
1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, 43 Stat. 260. It is clear that under the present Code, any loss
in excess of both ordinary income and capital gains would survive for use in later years.
See text accompanying notes 72-74 supra.
"" Although the statute was amended in 1934, the fact that the carryback could not be
offset against capital gains probably was not clear until 1956. See Weil v. Commissioner,
229 F.2d 593 (6th Cir. 1956).
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more likely that when Congress repealed the provision allowing for
carrybacks to be offset against capital gains, it was unaware that it
was creating a second question about whether those carrybacks in ex-
cess of ordinary income could survive for use in subsequent years.
Foster Lumber's third policy argument concerned how two ameliora-
tive provisions of the Code, sections 172 and 1201, should be con-
strued when they conflict. It is important to make several distinctions
at this point. 08 First, the taxpayer must compute the amount of its
net operating loss. 10' The Code is quite specific in its provisions on
the computation of the loss, and it is clear that under section 172(c),
only the loss in excess of both ordinary income and capital gains is
available for carry to another year." 0 The amount of the loss itself must
be distinguished from the amount of loss to be carried to another year.
After computing the amount of the loss, the taxpayer then computes
the amount of loss that can be carried from the loss year to another
year. This procedure is controlled by the now-familiar section 172(b).
Finally, after carrying the loss to another year, the Code gives specific
directions on how to deduct the carryback from the income of prior
years. "
One commentator has suggested that the result adopted by Chartier
and urged by Foster Lumber creates "superdeductions."" 2  The argu-
ment is worthy of consideration. Suppose a taxpayer suffers an ordinary
loss of $6,000 in 1966, and capital gains of $1,000,000. The taxpayer
would pay its tax based on the lower alternative method; the $6,000
loss would not be offset against the capital gains" 3 nor would it be
available to carry to another year." 4 Thus, the $6,000 loss is "wasted;"
it serves to offset the taxable income of neither the current year" 5
nor any other year." 16  Suppose also that in a later year, 1969, the
taxpayer incurs a $10,000 net operating loss which it carries back to
10 Reference to the chart in the text following note 22 supra may prove help-
ful. The distinctions are discussed in Pomeroy, What is a Net Operating Loss?, 14 W.
REs. L. REV. 233, 233 (1963). For illustrations of the operation of loss carryovers, see
Note, The Michigan Single Business Tax Act: A Blueprint For Ohio?, 25 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
219, 254 n.208 (1976); Note, Foster Lumber: Scratching the Surface of the Problem, 1 J.
CoRP. L. 164 (1975).
10' This computation is controlled by I.R.C. § 172(c).
110 See I.R.C. § 172(c).
"I I.R.C. § 172(a).
112 May, Net Operating Losses and Capital Gains - A Deceptive Combination, 29
TAX LAW. 121, 133-36 (1975). See also Branda, Net Operating Losses and Capital Gains
- Some Bizarre Consequences of the Alternative Tax Computation, 28 TAX LAW. 455
(1975); 8 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 442 (1971).
11 The alternative tax would be 30 percent of the capital gain, irrespective of the
ordinary loss. See I.R.C. § 1201(a). With such a large capital gain, the 30 percent rate
under the alternative method would produce a lower tax than would the 48 percent rate
under the regular method. Compare I.R.C. § 11(b) with id. § 1201(a).
114 No carryover would be available since deductions cannot exceed gross income in this
fact pattern in which there is an ordinary loss of $6,000 but capital gains of $1,000,000.
See I.R.C. § 172(c).
115 Since it cannot be offset against capital gain.




1966.117 Although Chartier did not deal with this situation specifically,
presumably, the Chartier court would hold that the $10,000 carryback
from 1969 survived for use in a year subsequent to 1966 because the
carryback did not affect the 1966 tax liability. 118 This carryback sur-
vival creates the "superdeduction." The $6,000 ordinary loss had no ef-
fect on the 1966 tax liability because it did not offset that year's capital
gains. Yet, the $10,000 loss carried to 1966 would be allowed by
Chartier to survive for use in subsequent years because it had no effect
on the 1966 liability. If an ordinary loss incurred in 1966 had no ef-
fect on 1966 liability and could not be carried to another year, why
should a loss incurred in 1969, which then carried to 1966 did not affect
liability for that year, be permitted to survive for use in a year subse-
quent to 1966? Under the Chartier theory, the loss from 1969 is al-
lowed to be carried from year to year until it is used, while the 1966 loss
is forever "wasted." Thus, more favorable treatment is accorded to
carryback losses than to those incurred in the carryback year.
The argument is persuasive and it was one only alluded to by the
Foster Lumber majority.1 1 9 It shows that a logical extension of the
argument presented by Foster Lumber can lead to unreasonable results
that were probably not intended by Congress.120
C. The Dissent
The dissenters in Foster Lumber12 1 seem to have been impressed by
the unfairness of the majority decision and by Foster Lumber's various
policy arguments. They pointed out that both the carryback and capital
gains provisions favored the taxpayer, but that the majority decision
favored the government.122 Unfortunately, the dissent did not engage
in a detailed analysis of the statute, but rather, pointed to the long list
117 The situation is illustrated below. Asterisks indicate figures irrelevant to the hypo-
thetical.
1966 1967 1968 1969
Ordinary Income (Loss) $ (6,000)
Capital Gains 1,000,000 * * *
Total Taxable Income (Loss) $ 994,000 * * $(10,000)
11 In Chartier, the portion of the carryback in excess of ordinary income was allowed
to be carried to subsequent years. See text accompanying notes 22-38 supra. One of
the court's primary reasons for allowing the use in subsequent years was the fact that
the carryback in excess of ordinary income did not affect the tax liability of the earliest carry-
back year. In the hypothetical above, the carryback would not affect the tax liability be-
cause the loss could not be offset against the capital gains and because no ordinary in-
come remained to be offset due to the ordinary loss incurred in 1966. See May, Net Oper-
ating Losses and Capital Gains - A Deceptive Combination, 29 TAx LAw. 121, 135-36
(1975); 8 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 442 (1971).
l"9 429 U.S. at 47-48.
120 This argument is an extension of, and effectively rebuts, Foster Lumber's argument
presented in the text accompanying notes 94-99 supra.
121 The dissenting opinion in Foster Lumber was authored by Justice Blackmun; Chief
Justice Burger, Justice Brennan, and Justice Powell joined. 429 U.S. at 49.
122 Id. at 50-51.
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of decisions that supported the taxpayer's position.'l ' While the un-
fairness of the decision may seem apparent, there are two things the
dissent failed to develop. First, nearly all of the decisions cited merely
rubber-stamped Chartier instead of engaging in any independent analy-
sis. Because of this fact, their precedential value is weak. Second, as
the majority so carefully developed, the statute simply does not support
the result urged by Foster Lumber.
The dissent dismissed the analysis of section 172(d) (2) (B) as irrele-
vant because that section deals with noncorporate taxpayers while Foster
Lumber was a corporate taxpayer.124  The dissent is correct in its as-
sertion that section 172(d)(2)(B) has no independent significance in this
case, as was also noted by the majority. 12 5 Its significance lies not in
the section itself, but with its relation to section 172(b)(2). As developed
earlier, 126 if the Chartier theory were followed, section 172(d)(2)(B)
would be rendered superfluous. Therein lies its importance. Any con-
struction of section 172(b)(2) that renders section 172(d)(2)(B) super-
fluous should be closely scrutinized.
Finally, the dissent urged that section 172(c) is irrelevant, since it
deals with the loss year, which was not in question in Foster Lumber.
27
This proposition again misses. the mark. The dissent is correct in that
section 172(c) has no independent significance; its importance lies only
in its relation to the carryback year. The section illustrates that Con-
gress often treats loss years differently from carryback years and that
Congress often permits the "wasting" of losses.
12
III. CONCLUSION
Based upon the statute standing alone, the Court quite accurately
found for the government. Foster Lumber's statutory arguments re-
quired a strained reading; reference to related statutory provisions
seems to imply that the government's interpretation is correct. The
Court supported its decision with detailed statutory analysis, although
it did appear to be somewhat confused by section 172(d)(2)(B). The
majority, however, did not draw upon the regulations, which also support
the decision.
Foster Lumber was able to present two strong policy arguments.
One was that when Congress has enacted two ameliorative tax provi-
sions, they should not be construed to deny the benefit of one of them
when there is a conflict. While the argument makes sense as a general
'M Id. at 54-56.
124 Id. at 58.
125 Id. at 48 n.1 8 .
126 See text accompanying notes 80-83 supra.
127 429 U.S. at 58.
US See id. at 46-48; see aLso text accompanying notes 108-20 supra.
Justice Stevens wrote a somewhat confusing one paragraph concurrence which seems to
be based on the arguments presented in the text accompanying notes 108-20 supra.
He noted that he would have liked to have adopted the dissent's result but could find no




proposition, its implementation in this case would require such strained
statutory reading that it would be difficult to justify. The second policy
argument demonstrated the unfairness of the majority decision. How-
ever, a logical extension of Foster Lumber's reasoning shows that the
interpretation advanced would create a "superdeduction" not con-
templated by Congress. Thus, while at the outset Foster Lumber's posi-
tion would appear to stand on firm policy ground, it is unworkable in
its logical conclusion and probably not correct. Unfortunately, the Court
did not develop the argument to its logical conclusion or use it to support
the decision.
Considering policy factors, legislative history, and the Code itself,
the Foster Lumber decision appears to be correct. Why, then, was the
decision so close - four for affirmance, one concurring, and four dis-
senting? The answer seems to rest with the proposition that when two
ameliorative provisions of the Code conflict, the taxpayer should not be
denied the benefit of one of them. Since the statute, policy, and legis-
lative history all support the government, however, the only remaining




23Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1976
24https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol25/iss4/7
